The Center for Middle East Studies at Rutgers University hosted a major conference this weekend dedicated to an academic review of the thirty years following the Iranian Revolution. There were scholars in attendance from around the world. A friend of mine who is very interested in interfaith issues asked me to join him, and I had a wonderful time.
I provide a summary of only some of the many wonderful speakers below.
Reza Akbari of Freedom House talked about the role of the Guardian Council in Iranian Government. The parliament issues laws, but they have to be found in compliance with Shariya law or they are disallowed. About 40% of the laws that elected officials pass are discarded by this council. Another council exists to try to reconcile disputes between the parliament and the Guardian Council. The whole process is rather disenfranchising.
Kevan Harris of Johns Hopkins University talked about the big role of entitlements in Iranian society. It reminded me a bit of how Social Security is a sacred cow in the US. No one can tinker with entitlements in Iran without getting burned, apparently.
Babak Rahimi delivered a vibrant lecture that included a fascinating discussion of the role of the web in Iranian politics and society.
Sina Mossayeb discussed the intellectual drain (not just a brain drain) that Iranian society has experienced over the past thirty years. (Note that the concept of Iran's brain drain gets its own entry at Wikipedia.)
Trita Parsi, of the National Iranian American Council, gave an interesting lecture on how best for America and Iran to come together to work through their differences. He pointed out that if President Obama can elucidate a substantial endgame to bilateral talks, Iran and the US can likely move forward in small steps with some success. But if there is no ultimate goal in mind and talks proceed only to mitigate tactical problems faced by the US, such as troublesome issues in Iraq and Afghanistan, then Iran is less likely to participate. Parsi believes that Iran's goal is to be recognized as a key player in the Middle East and was burned by the US after helping in Afghanistan after 9/11.
George Sanikidze, of Tbilisi State University, talked about Iran and its relations with the South Caucasus, especially in light of the Russia-Georgia conflict last fall. It was interesting to hear that both Iran and Russia fear NATO enlargement.
Radwan Ziadeh, of Harvard, discussed relations with Syria, breaking up the post-revolutionary period into three ever-warming periods - 1979-1990 (allies), 1990-2000 (friends), 2000-2008 (axis). My impression from how he described the periods in question was that Syria's Hafez al Assad lacked trust of Iran until Khomenei's death and Assad's son, Bashar al Assad, has suffered under Iran's heel ever since his father died.
Be sure to support the center by attending future events you find interesting. This weekend's conference was free. An upcoming comedy night planned for 25 March may involve a fee.
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2 comments:
Of course I'd have to comment. The first I heard of the Iranian Revolution was when I read Gary Sick's book All Fall Down. There aren't many revolutions where literally you can chart it going backwards. But then again, the US was so focused on the Tudeh party gaining power that Khomeini didn't seem plausible nor that bad to US policymakers at the time. Oh, we learned very painfully how plausible of a leader he was. Strangely enough, he fostered the cult of personality despite professing humility in religious life. He had read and mastered Sadra's Four Journeys and thought he was implementing God's divine will. He never did answer those who asked him repeatedly whether he was the Twelfth Imam. He just let his people think he was their moral leader. And we live with that today still.
To think how much the world has changed because of him and the Shah.
We created Khomenei's opportunity in 1953 when we helped depose Mossadegh and installed the Shah. 1979 wasn't so much an Islamic Revolution as it was an anti-Pahlavi Revolution and, by extension, an anti-US Revolution. The masses knew what they didn't want, but if they could have seen ahead a bit they would have known they didn't want Khomenei either. But they were on a blind curve.
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